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Abstract: Based on the panel data of 75 commercial banks in China from 2008 to 2017, this paper 
uses four methods: mixed estimation, fixed effect, differential moment estimation and system moment 
estimation, to examine the impact of leverage ratio regulation on commercial bank risks and the 
influence of heterogeneity of commercial banks on regulatory effectiveness. We found that, first, the 
supervision of leverage ratio effectively reduces the risks of Chinese commercial banks; second, the 
heterogeneity of Chinese commercial banks will lead to differences in regulatory effects. For banks 
that are listed with lower capital levels and have higher risk preference, leverage ratio regulation 
has a stronger inhibitory effect on bank risks. On this basis, it is recommended that the regulators 
implement differentiated supervisory measures for commercial banks with different capital levels and 
risk reference while strengthening supervision of leverage.
Key Words: leverage regulation; heterogeneity; bank risk.
Resumen: Con una muestra de 75 bancos comerciales en China, desde 2008 a 2017, este artículo 
utiliza cuatro métodos, como son: estimación mixta, efecto fijo, estimación del momento diferencial 
y estimación del momento del sistema. Se examina el impacto de la regulación del coeficiente de 
apalancamiento sobre los riesgos de los bancos comerciales y la influencia de la heterogeneidad de 
los bancos comerciales en la eficacia regulatoria. Descubrimos que, en primer lugar, la supervisión 
del coeficiente de apalancamiento reduce eficazmente los riesgos de los bancos comerciales chinos; 
en segundo lugar, la heterogeneidad de los bancos comerciales chinos generará diferencias en los 
efectos regulatorios. Para los bancos que están listados con niveles de capital más bajos y tienen 
una preferencia de riesgo más alta, la regulación del coeficiente de apalancamiento tiene un efecto 
inhibitorio más fuerte sobre los riesgos bancarios. Sobre esta base, se recomienda que los reguladores 
implementen medidas de supervisión diferenciadas para los bancos comerciales con diferentes niveles 
de capital y referencia de riesgo, a la vez que se fortalezca la supervisión de apalancamiento.









The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 caused huge losses 
to European and American financial institutions that have overused 
high leverage. Based on this, the Basel Committee formulated a new 
regulatory standard, the Basel III, in 2010 to incorporate leverage into the 
international banking regulation system. In China, 3% is set as the minimum 
leverage standard. In June 2011, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
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promulgated the Measures for the Administration of the Leverage Ratio 
of Commercial Banks, which determined the overall framework of China’s 
banking industry’s leverage ratio regulation policy, and set the minimum 
standard for commercial banks’ leverage ratio at 4%.
The original intention of leverage regulation is to reduce the risk level 
of commercial banks. However, based on different model settings, research 
scopes and research stages, scholars have drawn different conclusions on 
the relationship between leverage regulation and commercial bank risk. 
Kiema and Jokivuolle (2010) and others believe that for assets with the 
same nominal value but different risks, the leverage requirement requires 
the same amount of capital to be held, which will form a reverse incentive 
for commercial banks and increase bank risk. Frenkel and Rudolf (2010), 
Kellermann and Schlag (2013), Allahrakha et al. (2018) used data from 
Commerz bank, Swiss Bank, and Bank of America, respectively, also found 
that leverage regulation will generate reverse incentives and increase the 
allocation of high-risk assets to increase bank risk. Huang Haibo (2012) 
and others used a multivariate linear programming method to analyze the 
impact of leverage regulation and capital adequacy regulation on bank 
risk from the perspective of bank asset holding behavior, and found that 
leverage regulation will increase bank risks to a certain extent.
However, other scholars believe that leverage regulation can reduce 
the probability of bank failure and the possibility of expected deposit losses, 
and enhance the risk absorption capacity of commercial banks, thereby 
reducing risk. Robert (2013) calculated the maximum leverage ratio, and 
compared and analyzed the effects of leverage and capital adequacy ratio 
regulation and bank risk. Research shows that leverage regulation can 
reduce bankruptcy expectations, and its ability to control bank risks is 
simpler and more direct, and it can more effectively control bank risks. 
Kiema and Jokivulle (2014) believes that there is additional loss absorption 
capacity in leverage, which can cover risks that are not covered under 
the risk capital framework, which is conducive to increasing the stability 
of banks. Yuan Yuan and Rao Sufan (2014) found that leverage regulation 
helps banks to disclose the true level of risk and avoid regulatory arbitrage. 
From a dynamic long-term perspective, it will form rigid constraints on 
the development model, risk management and capital quality of Chinese 
commercial banks. The combination of leverage ratio regulation and 
capital adequacy ratio can effectively reduce the risky behavior of banks 
and gradually reduce their risk level. Dermine (2015) established a new 
credit risk model based on short-term loans and incomplete information, 
proving that in an economic boom period, the leverage index can prevent 
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commercial banks from excessive credit expansion and can ensure that 
commercial banks have sufficient capital to cope with the crisis. Run. Smith 
et al. (2017) pointed out that the proposed leverage ratio will promote 
capital-constrained banks to increase their risks, but the bank ’s risk-taking 
behavior will also increase the bank’s capital, which will also increase the 
ability to absorb losses and promote the stability of the banks themselves.
Other scholars believe that the impact of leverage on commercial 
bank risk depends on relevant conditions. Ba Shusong et al. (2013) pointed 
out that in the face of banks with different average risk weights, conversion 
coefficients and ratios of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet assets, 
the effectiveness of leverage regulation will be different. Jin Yuying and 
Jia Songbo (2016) believe that the introduction of leverage regulation 
has improved the banking supervision system, increased the proportion of 
commercial banks’ own capital, and reduced the probability of bankruptcy. 
From the perspective of a commercial bank, the level of asset spreads 
affects the role of leverage ratio regulation on its asset structure. Only 
when the spread is small will the leverage ratio regulation increase 
the proportion of high-risk assets. Wang Li (2017) believes that China’s 
low interest rate policy increases commercial banks’ risk, while capital 
regulation and market constraints reduce risk. The final effect depends on 
the size of the two effects and the strength of the risk transfer effect.
Then, as a kind of ex-ante regulation indicator, does leverage regulation 
really achieve the effect of reducing the risk of commercial banks? Will the 
heterogeneity of commercial banks, such as whether they are listed, have 
different levels of capital, and have different risk reference, affect the 
effect of leverage regulation? This paper attempts to answer these two 
questions through empirical research based on panel data of 75 Chinese 
commercial banks from 2008 to 2017, and provides some suggestions for 
further improving and refining China’s leverage ratio supervision system 
regulation.
2. Theoretical analysis
Theoretically speaking, leverage ratio regulation will cause chang-
es in three aspects: the level of prudential regulation of regulators, the 
risk preference of commercial banks, and the transparency of informa-
tion. These three changes will further affect the risk level of commercial 
banks. Therefore, this paper will employ micro-prudential channel, macro-
prudential channel, risk preference channel, and information channel to 
specifically analyze how leverage ratio regulation influences the risk level 
of commercial banks.
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2.1 Micro-prudential Channel
As a newly included micro-prudential management tool, leverage 
ratio regulation stipulates the minimum leverage ratio, and dynamically 
tracks the risk level of commercial banks. In order to meet the regulatory 
requirements, commercial banks can increase Tier 1 capital and reduce 
asset growth. Tier 1 capital accumulation not only improves the quality 
of bank-owned capital and the ability of banks to absorb losses, but also 
enables banks to maintain more sufficient liquidity. Under leverage ratio 
regulation, commercial banks tend to cut down the activity of loan transac-
tions and step up the lending inspections, which also helps alleviate bank 
risk.
2.2 Macro-prudential Channel
Due to its counter-cyclical characteristic, leverage ratio regulation is 
not only a micro-prudential management tool, but also a macro-prudential 
management tool to control the risks of commercial banks. When the econ-
omy is in a prosperous period, commercial banks have a strong desire to 
expand rapidly, while in a period of economic recession, commercial banks 
are cautious about investment. As a counter-cyclical regulatory tool, lever-
age ratio regulation can effectively curb the excessive expansion of com-
mercial banks during economic prosperity and reduce the systemic risks, 
which will lower the risk level of commercial banks.
2.3 Risk Preference Channel
The risk preference of a commercial bank is determined by its board 
of directors and management. If the board of directors and management 
prefers to be more risk-seeking, the commercial bank will invest in high-
risk assets in order to pursue greater profits. Leverage ratio regulation 
reduces the risk preference of commercial banks by stipulating credit con-
version coefficients and minimum capital requirements, thereby weakening 
commercial banks’ desire to invest in high-risk assets, decreasing the scale 
of investment in high-risk assets, and ultimately reducing commercial bank 
risk.
2.4 Information Channel
Leverage ratio regulation reduces the risk of commercial banks by 
eliminating the asymmetry of information between commercial banks and 
creditors, and also between commercial banks and regulators. Leverage 
ratio regulation requires commercial banks to regularly disclose their le-
verage ratio levels, which can clearly reflect the scale of banks’ leveraged 
assets, enable depositors to understand banks’ conditions more intuitively, 
enhance depositors’ confidence, and reduce the probability of bank runs. 
In addition, the leverage ratio regulation also requires commercial banks 
Zou Wei and Liu Tao
161
邹薇 and 刘涛
Sinologia Hispanica, China Studies Review, 11, 2 (2020), pp. 157-174
to disclose their on- and off-balance sheet assets. This enables regulators 
to have a clearer and direct grasp of the scale of commercial banks’ off-
balance sheet assets, and can prevent commercial banks from participating 
in regulatory arbitrage by taking advantage of information asymmetry be-
tween the two parties and transferring assets to off-balance sheet. There-
fore, bank risk generated by regulatory arbitrage will also be reduced.
3. Model setting and variable selection
Due to the dynamic adjustment of bank risk, this paper uses a dynamic 
panel model for estimation. The specific model is constructed as follows:
ε tiitititititi umacroabankalevaZaaZ ,,4,3,21,10, ++++++= −  (1)
Among them, the subscript i is the number of banks in the sample;t 
is the sample survey time;ui is the unobservable individual effect;εi,tis the 
random disturbance term. The explained variable uses the bankruptcy 
probability index Z to measure bank risk, and the core explanatory 
variable measures the difference between the actual leverage ratio of the 
commercial bank is a and the regulatory requirement of 4% to measure the 
leverage index (lev). bank is a bank-level control variables, select bank 
asset growth rate (Agt), tier 1 capital (Toc), risk appetite (Riska), liquidity 
(Liq), provision ratio (Pro), loan-to-deposit ratio (Loa), cost-income ratio 
(Cost); macro is the control variables at the macro level, select the year-
on-year growth rate of currency (M2) and nominal GDP growth rate (GDP). 
Equation (1) is to test the effect of regulation on the leverage of the entire 
sample.
Considering the differences between different types of banks, the 
full sample is divided into two categories: listed and unlisted. Formula (1) 
is used to examine the difference in the effect of leverage regulation of 
different types of banks.
Multiplying Tier 1 capital, risk reference, and leveraged regulatory 
variables as an interaction term is introduced into the measurement model 
to obtain Equation (2).
ε tiitititititititi umacroabankaclevalevaZaaZ ,,5,4,,3,21,10, ++++×+++= − (2)
In equation (2), the interaction term between the control variable 
and the leverage ratio regulation to be examined by lev×c, the analysis 
of the coefficient and significance of a3 is focused, and the non-linear 
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characteristics of bank risk affected by Tier 1 capital and risk preference 
variables can be observed.
Table 1: Variable definition table
Variable type Variable name Representation
Explained variables Bank risk Z
Core explanatory variables
Leverage regulation Lev
Leverage regulation * Tier 1 
capital TocLev×
Table 1: Variable definition table(continued)
Variable type Variable name Representation
Leverage regulation * risk preference RiskaLev×
Control variables
Risk lag terms L. ln z
Tier 1 capital Toc
Control variables
Risk preference Riska






Money supply growth rate 2M
GDP growth rate GDP
This paper selects the data of 75 commercial banks in China from 
2008 to 2017 as the research sample, including 35 listed banks and 40 
unlisted banks. The sample financial data comes from the Wind Source 
Database, the Bankscope Database, and the annual reports of the banks, 
while the risk Z value and the leverage index are calculated from the 
original data. For the missing data of individual variables in individual bank 
years, interpolation is used to supplement them.
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The descriptive statistical analysis of the main variables is shown in 
Table 2. It can be seen, first, the overall risk level of Chinese commercial 
banks is low, with an average risk Z value of 4.3777; second, the average 
leverage ratio of Chinese commercial banks is 6.632, which has clearly 
exceeded the standard value of 4% set by the Chinese regulatory authority 
This situation occurred because some banks had low leverage ratios before 
the 2011. After 2011, all banks have reached the 4% regulatory requirement.
Table 2: Descriptive statistical analysis of variables
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Lnz 750.000 4.337 0.949 1.583 7.450
L.lnz 675.000 4.257 0.903 1.583 7.450
Lev 750.000 2.632 1.580 -0.908 12.670
Toc 750.000 9.595 1.716 5.475 14.562
Riska 750.000 0.615 0.095 0.304 0.885
Agt 750.000 0.250 0.254 -0.248 4.628
Loa 750.000 63.435 10.348 21.030 89.800
Liq 750.000 49.638 11.070 24.570 81.950
Pro 750.000 249.433 115.504 53.082 852.28
Cost 750.000 33.589 6.814 14.830 60.418
2M 750.000 15.424 5.379 8.110 28.420
GDP 750.000 8.270 1.334 6.700 10.600
4. Empirical Results
In order to control the endogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
the possible heteroscedasticity problem in the model, and the weak tool 
variable problem of the differential GMM method, this paper uses the 
systematic GMM method for estimation.
4.1 Leverage Regulation and Commercial Bank Risk
The full sample is used to study the relationship between leverage 
regulation and commercial bank risk. The empirical results are shown in Table 3.
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The p-values of all sargan tests in Table 3 reject the null hypothesis 
at the 10% level, indicating that the model does not have an over-
identification problem. Similarly, the P value corresponding to the second-
order sequence correlation test in the table also shows that there is no 
second-order sequence correlation in the model, and the regression results 
are not affected by the residual sequence correlation, so the model setting 
is reasonable.
Table 3: Impact of leverage regulation on commercial bank risks
Estimation 
method
OLS FE FD GMM
Dependent 
variable
Lnz Lnz Lnz Lnz
L.lnz 0.445*** 0.455*** 0.422*** 0.482***
(0.0338) (0.0336) (0.0416) (0.0337)
Lev 0.0597** 0.0586** 0.0782* 0.100***
(0.0236) (0.0229) (0.0435) (0.0342)
Riska -1.196*** -0.918** -1.816** -1.307**
(0.412) (0.403) (0.826) (0.652)
Toc 0.0890*** 0.0881*** 0.393* 0.0985*
(0.0216) (0.0210) (0.218) (0.0536)
Agt -0.0788 -0.0554 -0.117 -0.105
(0.121) (0.120) (0.147) (0.0970)
Loa 0.00413 0.00253 -0.0114* -0.0102**
(0.00311) (0.00303) (0.00673) (0.00423)
Liq -0.000617 -0.000912 -0.00172 0.000230
(0.00280) (0.00273) (0.00479) (0.00336)
Pro 0.000816*** 0.000709** 0.00142*** 0.00133***
(0.000268) (0.000283) (0.000395) (0.000272)
Cost 0.00512 0.00214 -0.0187** -0.0214***
(0.00478) (0.00467) (0.00924) (0.00725)
2M -0.0530*** -0.124*** -0.0384*** -0.0555***
(0.00806) (0.0249) (0.0143) (0.00730)
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GDP 0.0621* 0.553*** 0.0972* 0.0635**
(0.0350) (0.180) (0.0501) (0.0283)
Constant 1.881*** -0.581 -2.154 0.522
(0.569) (1.085) (2.851) (0.906)
N 673 673 597 673
Table 3: Impact of leverage regulation on commercial bank risks(continued)
Estimation 
method




The explanatory variable lev coefficient in Table 3 is significantly 
positive, indicating that leverage regulation helps reduce bank risk. Leverage 
regulation reduces the risk of commercial banks by requiring them to 
enrich their capital and control asset expansion. In addition, all the results 
of the lagging phase coefficient (L.lnz) of the explanatory variables are 
significantly positive at the 1% confidence level, indicating that the choice 
of the dynamic panel model is reasonable, and the bank risk has a strong 
positive correlation with the previous year, but the effect will gradually 
Weaken. Among the effects of other control variables on bank risk, the Tier 
1 capital coefficient, the provision ratio coefficient, and the GDP growth 
rate coefficient are significantly positive; the loan-deposit ratio coefficient, 
the cost-income ratio coefficient, and the M2 growth rate coefficient are 
significantly negative. The estimated coefficients and significance of these 
control variables are basically consistent with theoretical expectations.
4.2 Heterogeneity of Commercial Banks and Regulation of Leverage
To investigate whether the effect of leverage ratio regulation differs 
due to the heterogeneity of commercial banks, the empirical results are 
shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: The impact of heterogeneity of commercial banks 
on the effect of leverage regulation
Listed Non-listed Full Sample Full Sample
Dependent 
variable
Lnz Lnz Lnz Lnz
L.lnz 0.338*** 0.530*** 0.187*** 0.184***
(0.0447) (0.0468) (0.0510) (0.0467)
Riska -1.574** -1.345 -2.238*** -2.225**
(0.692) (0.913) (0.617) (1.036)
Toc -0.00229 0.283** 0.361*** 0.177***





Lev 0.120*** 0.0743* 0.837*** 0.126**
(0.0431) (0.0420) (0.273) (0.0532)
Agt -0.618** -0.0432 -0.139 -0.0778
(0.273) (0.110) (0.158) (0.125)
Loa 0.00649 -0.0113** 0.00537 0.00404
(0.00602) (0.00507) (0.00683) (0.00838)
Table 4: The impact of heterogeneity of commercial banks on the effect of leverage 
supervision (continued)
Listed Non-listed Full Sample Full Sample
Liq 0.00571 0.00236 0.00613 0.00718
(0.00483) (0.00417) (0.00606) (0.00556)
Pro 0.000729* 0.00131*** 0.00153*** 0.00170***
(0.000424) (0.000337) (0.000529) (0.000570)
Cost -0.0568*** 0.00448 0.0203 0.0218
Zou Wei and Liu Tao
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(0.0118) (0.00841) (0.0155) (0.0139)
M2 -0.0668*** -0.0457*** -0.0529*** -0.0473***
(0.00937) (0.0123) (0.00948) (0.0103)
GDP 0.0421 0.0730* -0.00530 0.000544
(0.0384) (0.0442) (0.0436) (0.0450)
Constant 1.904** -1.043 6.089*** 0.789
(0.945) (1.710) (1.284) (1.105)
N 315 360 675 675
AR(2) 0.23 0.18 0.31 0.26
pSargan 0.83 0.72 0.78 0.73
From the first and second columns of Table 4, it can be seen that the 
leverage factor of both listed and unlisted banks is positive and significant. 
However, the regulatory coefficient of listed banks is greater than that 
of non-listed banks, which indicates that the positive effect of leverage 
regulation on listed banks is greater. The possible reason is that compared 
with non-listed banks, the listed banks are rich in human resources, business 
resources, and access to funds, which makes the intermediary business and 
innovative business develop better. In order to survive, non-listed banks 
have a stronger willingness to choose to run high-risk businesses, and will 
face more operational risks, credit risks, and liquidity risks, which will 
weaken the effectiveness of the regulation of leverage ratios to a certain 
extent.
In the third column, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
leverage supervision and Tier 1 capital is significantly negative, which 
means that with the expansion of Tier 1 capital, the positive effect of 
leverage regulation on commercial banks will decrease, while the positive 
effect on weak capital banks is relatively large. The possible reason is that 
sufficient capital enables commercial banks to have better capital quality 
and stronger liquidity, so that the banks themselves have a stronger ability 
to withstand risks, and at the same time, it makes it easier for commercial 
banks to meet regulatory requirements. That is to say, adequate capital 
will weaken the effectiveness of leverage regulation.
In the fourth column, the coefficient of leverage regulation and risk 
preference is positive, which means that the increase in risk preference 
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will increase the positive effect of risk on commercial banks, that is, 
the implementation of leverage regulation will affect banks with a high-
risk preference. The positive effect is relatively large. The “Commercial 
Banking Leverage Management Measures (Amendment)” specifies the 
coefficients of the weights of various types of risky assets in the calculation 
of commercial banks ‘leverage ratios, so commercial banks’ enthusiasm for 
high-risk assets and businesses will decrease. In addition, the higher capital 
requirements make banks need to bear more of their own capital when 
losses occur, and the minimum losses borne by shareholders will increase 
accordingly. Therefore, for banks with high-risk reference, the effect of the 
leverage regulation will be relatively large.
5. Robustness Test
In order to ensure the validity of the model estimation results, this 
paper uses the non-performing loan ratio as the explanatory variable 
and the dummy variable (lev11) as the core explanatory variable in the 
robustness test. The dummy variable was set to 0 before 2011, and vice 
versa 1.
5.1 Leverage Regulation and Robustness Test of Commercial Bank 
Risks
The robustness test is performed on the relationship between the 
leverage effect and the risk of commercial banks. The results are shown in 
Table 5.
Table 5: Leverage Regulation and Robustness Test of Commercial Bank Risks
Estimation 
method OLS FE FD GMM
Dependent 
variable Non Non Non Non
nonL. 0.458*** 0.355*** 0.380*** 0.330***
(0.0307) (0.0364) (0.0388) (0.0289)
Lev11 -0.686** -0.661** -0.658** -0.565**
(0.292) (0.312) (0.331) (0.241)
Riska 0.174 1.280 1.149** 0.798**
(0.772) (1.181) (0.538) (0.405)
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Toc 0.00381 0.342 -0.505** -0.309**
(0.0452) (0.340) (0.252) (0.137)
Control 
variable
Y Y Y Y




As shown in Table 5, the regression model does not include interaction 
terms. It mainly studies the relationship between leverage regulation and 
commercial bank risk. From the regression results in Table 5, it can be seen 
that the leverage ratio regulation coefficients are -0.686, -0.661, -0.658, 
and -0.565, respectively. The regression coefficients are significantly 
negative, indicating that leverage regulation can help reduce the risk of 
commercial banks. The results are consistent.
5.2 Leverage Regulation and Robustness Test of Bank Heterogeneity
The robustness test is performed to see if the effect of the leverage 
ratio regulation is different due to the heterogeneity of commercial banks. 
The results are shown in Table 6.
According to the first and second columns of Table 6, it can be seen 
that the regulatory coefficients of leverage of both listed and non-listed 
banks are negative and significant, but the regulatory factors of listed 
banks are greater than those of non-listed banks
Table 6: Robustness test of the effect of heterogeneity of commercial banks on the 
regulation of leverage
Listed Non-listed Full Sample Full Sample
Dependent 
variable
Non Non Non Non
nonL. 0.337*** 0.344*** 0.289*** 0.294***
(0.0155) (0.0416) (0.0304) (0.0300)
Riska 0.0428 -3.396 0.464 4.355**
(0.156) (2.533) (1.294) (1.893)
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Toc -0.0549*** 0.309 -0.583*** -0.0556





Lev11 -0.913** -0.319* -0.625** -0.461*
(0.457) (0.181) (0.293) (0.279)
Control 
variable
Y Y Y Y
N 315 360 675 675
AR(2) 0.42 0.23 0.35 0.30
pSargan 
0.76 0.61 0.63 0.59
In the third column, the interaction coefficient between leverage 
regulation and Tier 1 capital is significantly positive, which means that the 
expansion of Tier 1 capital and the positive effect of leverage regulation 
on commercial banks will reduce the risk, that is, the implementation of 
leverage regulation will affect banks’ capital level ,the positive effects of 
weak banks are relatively large.
In the fourth column, the leverage ratio regulation and risk reference 
are negative, which means that the increase in risk reference will increase 
the positive effect of risk on commercial banks, relatively bigger.
All the conclusions from the robustness test are consistent with the 
conclusions from the previous regression, so the basic conclusions of this 
paper are robust.
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Based on the panel data of 75 commercial banks in China from 
2008 to 2017, this paper uses hybrid estimation, fixed effect, differential 
moment estimation, and system moment estimation to empirically test the 
impact of leverage regulation on the risks of Chinese commercial banks. 
The conclusions are as follows: (1) Leverage regulation effectively reduced 
the risks of Chinese commercial banks. (2) As far as the effect of leverage 
ratio regulation is concerned, the effect of leverage ratio regulation on 
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listed banks is better than that of non-listed banks. (3) The regulatory 
effect of leverage is affected by the bank’s capital level and risk reference. 
Specifically, for banks with lower capital levels and higher risk reference, 
leverage regulation has a stronger inhibitory effect on bank risks.
This article accordingly proposes the following policy recommendations: 
(1) Regulators should continue to strengthen the regulation of commercial 
banks’ leverage levels. The implementation of leverage regulation is 
beneficial to reduce the risks of commercial banks. Therefore, regulators 
should urge commercial banks to disclose their leverage levels and 
ultimately achieve the purpose of controlling the risks of commercial banks; 
(2) Implement differentiated leverage regulation for different commercial 
banks. Specifically, higher leverage requirement should be adopted for 
listed banks, while relatively low leverage requirement for non-listed 
banks. Similarly, higher leverage requirement should also be adopted for 
those banks with high risk reference and insufficient capital.
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